Welfare Attitudes over time of 
Introduction
Welfare states vary regarding their level of solidarity, range of government responsibilities, universality of benefits, etc. It seems reasonable to expect that welfare attitudes of people will reflect the main concepts of the social policy emphasized in any particular welfare state. Gryaznova (2013) , for example, highlights how the welfare state regime explains 60 per cent of the variability of attitudes. If an analysis of welfare attitudes is conducted in the form of a comparison of similar groups of countries, differences might not be easy to distinguish due to difficulties with categorization. On the one hand, comparing individual countries could make the differences more robust, but on the other hand there certainly exists some heterogeneity within countries that could be overlooked.
In this paper we address a different perspective represented by types of attitude to welfare, which are to a certain extent influenced by welfare regimes. Analyses provided by Svallfors (1997) and Výrost (2010) have shown the existence of group patterns that are very similar between countries, despite the fact that people within such countries are influenced by their own culture, history, and actual political situation, etc. In other words, four different types of attitude may be identified within each country regardless of welfare regime. Furthermore, the former have something in common with representatives of the same attitudinal types in other countries.
The main aim of this paper is to investigate potential changes over time in welfare attitudes across Europe. Specifically, it focuses on the level of social solidarity and social differentiation in three groups of countries: the V4 region, Northern-, and Western European countries. The study is built upon European Social Survey (ESS) fourth-(2008) and eighth-(2016) round data. The analysis begins with a hypothesis about potentially significant differences in the level of social solidarity and social differentiation among the three different regions of Europe. Rejection of this hypothesis leads to the second goal of this contribution -an analysis of the common characteristics as well as disparities among four types of attitude to welfare that are present in Europe. For this purpose, four clusters of participants were defined on the basis of the average mean of social solidarity and social differentiation scales.
The interrelation between values and welfare attitudes has been widely discussed and proved by studies such as those of Gryaznova and Magun (2012) , Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom (2013) , Gryaznova (2013) , and Kulin and Meuleman (2015) . In contrast, in research by Svallfors, Kullin and Schnabel (2012) the relationship was not evident. However, the connection of values with social solidarity and social differentiation is not well known. According to Piterová (2018) , there is a connection between the level of social solidarity, social differentiation and some of the self-transcendence-, self-enhancement-, and conversation-related values. The first partial goal of this paper is to verify the hypothesis that there exist significant differences in value preferences among four types of welfare attitude.
The second partial goal is to study the hypothesized differences in the level of trust among four attitudinal types. There are two essential assumptions. First, that trust is the foundation of a welfare state. For example, Daniele and Geys (2015) confirm that people who trust others are more willing to pay higher taxes as well as increase state social spending. Second, the positive effect of interpersonal trust depends on the perceived quality of institutions, thus institutional trust has been included into the analysis.
How many welfare regimes actually exist?
The number of welfare regimes that exist has become the focus of various reconsiderations and modifications of typologies over the past decades. Criticism began with Esping-Andersen's (1990) typology of the 'three worlds of welfare capitalism.' This typology was based upon the operationalization of three principles: decommodification (which examined the extent to which an individual's welfare is reliant on the market), levels of social stratification (which examined the role of welfare states in maintaining or breaking down social stratification), and the privatepublic mix (which focused on the relative roles of the state, the family and the market in welfare provision). The application of these principles in 18 OECD countries resulted in the division of welfare states into three regime types: social democratic (e.g. Norway), corporatist (e.g. Germany), and liberal welfare regimes (e.g. the USA, and Australia).
The threefold typology was criticized for not taking into account Southern Europe, Eastern Europe, and Asian characteristics, which led to the distinction between the basic model (Leibfried, 1992 ) and the southern model (Ferrera, 1996; Bonoli, 1997) , which was later incorporated by Esping-Andersen (1998) as the Mediterranean model. Additionally, there is a familiaristic type of model whereby people rely more on their families and less on the government for social protection (Kalmijn and Saraceno, 2008) .
The second type, which was added later, is the aforementioned regime of 'Down Under' (Australia and New Zealand) which combines the elements of the liberal and social democratic system in which there are low income differences and high social benefits, paid mostly to the middle classes.
The third type that was added is the East-Asian one, which combines elements of the previous regimes, particularly the liberal and conservative ones, and in which the state does not provide a high level of social benefits because the employer or the family are instead assumed to take responsibility for care. Therefore, a person who does not work for a corporation that partially replaces state care is disadvantaged (Esping-Andersen, 1998) .
Since the fall of communism the former socialist countries have been classified together because they have been influenced in the same way by the earlier authoritarian regime and its high level of egalitarianism (Kulin and Meuleman, 2015) . Even since joining the European Union these countries are still included in analyses as post-socialist countries. After the transition of post-socialist countries and the noticeable influence of international organizations and of EU membership, questions still remain about the division of welfare states or, more specifically, about the necessity of a new categorization for European countries. Exploring this debate, however, is beyond the scope of this paper.
The last point in relation to the categorization and selection of countries for comparative analysis is that some countries are always included in such analyses as they represent the ideal-or a clear type of welfare regime. Netherlands represent a hybrid mix of conservative regime with clear social democratic and liberal traits (Arts and Gellisen, 2001 ), but are included only rarely. The Slovak Republic and other post-socialist countries with characteristics of both a liberal and conservative type echo this categorization issue in any comparison.
The mixed results of studies conducted thus far may have been caused by relying on a general typology of welfare states and indicators that fails to capture the complexity of institutional establishments and individual views (Jordan, 2013) . The comparative study of welfare states faces a selection problem. Reliance on such empirical categorizations and the lack of a match between descriptions and welfare states are becoming a greater problem in welfare-regime-and welfare attitude research.
3. Types of attitude to welfare as another option While there might be more than four types of welfare regimes in the world, the most commonly used classification includes four clear types, notwithstanding with the many countries that have adopted mixed or hybrid types. In any country, the majority of people probably have attitudes that reflect the welfare state regime, while there are also people whose attitudes are more or less consensual, along with those who are undecided and those who score on the middle of the scale. The direction of social policy is typically indicated by individual preferences and the majority decides, but a country as a whole is rarely homogeneous in this respect.
Some research has already examined this hypothesis. Svallfors (1997) analysed attitudes to redistribution and to income differences in eight western nations based on International Social Survey Program (ISSP) data (1992) about social inequality. The four welfare regime types appeared as four distinct types of attitudes to redistribution: the social democratic type included countries that supported welfare state intervention with an egalitarian view of income distribution, including Sweden and Norway. Conservative countries combined strong support for welfare state intervention with a preference for high income differences, including Germany and Austria. Liberal types of country showed a low level of support for government redistribution and an egalitarian view of income distribution; examples include the United States and Canada. The radical type was defined by low support for welfare state intervention and egalitarianism regarding income differences. Such countries include Australia and New Zealand. However, 'analysis showed that while the level of attitudes regarding redistribution and income differences clearly is affected by regime types, group patterns are very similar between the countries' (Svalffors, 1997: 283 Further analysis of the Slovak sample indicated that the four types of attitude to welfare assessed the government's responsibility for social security issues, the current state of social security, and prospects for the future differently. The results of a comparative analysis showed how the attitudes of respondents in different countries can converge. Additionally, the influence of culture and historically conditioned beliefs about the 'right' form of welfare state is undoubtedly present.
Two elements of welfare attitudes: social solidarity and social differentiation
Social solidarity has received a greater amount of attention since the various economic and financial crises which have affected the European Union following 2008. Similarly, recent migrant-related issues also cast light on the principle of solidarity and raise the question whether this will lead to a crisis of European solidarity. One hypothesis claims that in times of difficulty solidarity is oriented more strongly towards one's family or nation, while solidarity with Europe, the European Union, or with the rest of the world and humankind in general is weaker, according to perceived social proximity (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018) .
As solidarity is a complex phenomenon, it requires precise operationalization. There is more than one understanding of this concept because solidarity has become the focus of interest for sociology, economics and psychology, as well as political sciences. In general, social solidarity is understood as shared responsibility between members of society. It is based upon the subsidization principle, which means that the wealth of certain members of society is given to public institutions to satisfy social needs and provide support for people facing hardship. Furthermore, the welfare state should be responsible and provide support in cases when individuals, family or charities are unable to help their members. According to this perspective, a distinction is made between the horizontal and the vertical organization of solidarity: the former involves individuals bearing social risks by providing support to others, and the latter INTERSECTIONS. EAST EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF SOCIETY AND POLITICS, 5(1): 143-162.
involves responsibility being placed on the state (i.e. the government). Stjerno (2012: 2) defined indirect solidarity (vertical) as 'supporting the state to reallocate and redistribute some of the funds gathered through taxes or contributions.' It appears from this perspective that there is a difference in the commitment of citizens (Van Vugt and Peet, 2012) .
Another clarification should be made about the level of solidarity. 'It is possible to study local (such as regional or communal support for others); functional (in which social support is provided to employees and employers), inter-generational (such as pension systems whereby workers contribute to the state to provide welfare for the retired) and also supranational (such as the Union system providing support to member states) solidarity' (Dougan and Spaventa, 2005: 298) . In other words, if we focus on boundaries of solidarity we may debate the degree of inclusiveness or the limitation of solidarity. In addition, social security systems in Europe support different groups of people; for example, those facing hardship, the disabled, the retired, the unemployed, or single parents. Therefore, attitudes to welfare can be defined as a multidimensional phenomenon. Providing welfare benefits to the old, disabled, or sick can be perceived as functional and beneficial when compared to supporting the unemployed and poor, which sector of the population is more heterogeneous across individuals and nations (Van Oorschot, 2006; Jaeger, 2007) .
Despite the fact that solidarity is tied to specific groups and depends on social proximity, deservingness or targeted recipients (Van Oorschot, 2006) , and in many cases there is not adequate to measure general solidarity, we have focused on the solidarity of people in need who receive benefits and services from the welfare state. In particular, we understood and defined social solidarity in terms of vertical solidarity within the nation whereby people support the idea (or do not) of social benefits and services being provided by the state to people facing hardship.
Welfare states have also created social stratification to reduce equality: 'People tend to differentiate between people to decide whom to support' (Lahusen and Grasso, 2018: 253) , thus the second dimension of welfare attitudes in our paper is the preferred level of social differentiation which is defined as the distinction made between people or groups that results in the assignment of benefits and services within society. As can be seen, social differentiation is linked to social solidarity, and both are significant elements of welfare attitudes.
Welfare attitudes, trust, and values
The relationship of political and interpersonal trust to welfare attitudes has been widely discussed for decades. On one side, there are those studies that confirm this relationship, such as that of Svallfors (2012) . On the other hand, in some studies like those of Svallfors (1999) and Edlund (2006) the relationship is not proved. In addition, the concept of the quality of government instead of political trust was examined. For example, Svallfors (2013) confirmed that the perceived quality of government and egalitarianism have an effect on attitudes to social spending and taxes. Similarly, Daniele and Geys (2015) proved that interpersonal trust has a positive relationship with welfare state support. Moreover, the effect of interpersonal trust is conditional on the perceived quality of institutions.
In general, the link between values and welfare attitudes is well known. Some authors have confirmed that conversation and self-transcendence values increase the level of support for the welfare state, while the values of openness to change and selfenhancement have a negative effect (Gryaznova and Magun, 2012; Gryaznova, 2013) . Furthermore, analyses of values at the national level have confirmed that conversation is a stronger predictor in East Europe (Kulin and Meuleman, 2015; Gryaznova, 2013) , while self-transcendence was proved to be a stronger predictor in Western Europe. In a study by Piterová (2018) , the values of tradition and benevolence had an effect on the level of social solidarity, although the values of power and security were associated with a social differentiation.
Despite the fact that the research into types of welfare attitudes is still at the beginning, the aforementioned studies gave strong support for our hypothesis about the existence of differences in interpersonal and institutional trust and values among clusters that are based upon the preferred level of social solidarity and social differentiation.
Method
As the welfare attitudes module was repeated after eight years, the database of the European Social Survey provides an excellent opportunity to compare welfare attitudes across Europe over a specific time period. The module contains a set of questions about the effect of social benefits and services in different areas of life. There are two scales with five-point response scales ranging from 1 = 'Agree strongly' to 5= 'Disagree strongly,' which were constructed from items of the rotating module about welfare: the Social Solidarity Scale and Social Differentiation Scale. The former consists of two items with a reliability coefficient Cronbach α= .641. It includes the items 'Social benefits and services prevent widespread poverty' and 'Social benefits and services lead to more equal society.' The latter consists of six items with a reliability coefficient Cronbach α= .758, such as: 'Social benefits and services in a country place a great strain on the economy,' 'Social benefits and services make people lazy,' and 'Social benefits and services cost businesses too much in taxes and charges.' Scaling for social solidarity and social differentiation was reversed to make interpretation much easier, so 1 represents a low level of solidarity and differentiation and 5 means a high level of solidarity and differentiation.
Thanks to low intercorrelation between scales (r= -.126**) we assume the presence of two uncorrelated and orthogonal factors. The intersection of scales in their mean value of 3 creates four different clusters. Based on the average score of each respondent on the social solidarity and social differentiation scale, we were able to classify people in the dataset into four distinct clusters (the four types of attitude to welfare): social democratic, conservative, liberal, and radical -as described in the previous section, and depicted in Two scales were constructed from items of the core module with an 11-point scale ranging from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'low trust' and 10 means 'high trust.' The first scale, the Interpersonal Trust Scale, consists of three items with a reliability coefficient Cronbach α= .773, and includes specifically the questions 'Would you say that most people can be trusted or you can't be too careful in dealing with people?' 'Would most people try to take advantage of you if they got the chance, or would they try to be fair?' and 'Would you say that most of time people try to be helpful or that they are mostly looking out for themselves?' The second scale, the Institutional Trust Scale, consists of seven items asking people how much they personally trust a number of institutions, including the (national) parliament, the legal system, the police, politicians, political parties, the European parliament and the United Nations; this has a reliability coefficient Cronbach α= .905.
Data from the modified version of Shalom Schwartz's Portrait Values Questionnaire, which is part of a core section of the ESS questionnaire, was used to analyse the values. The questionnaire consists of 21 items that capture ten motivational types of value: Power, Achievement, Hedonism, Stimulation, SelfDirection, Universalism, Benevolence, Tradition, Conformity, and Security.
Respondents stated to what extent they resemble the person described in the items on a six-point scale, whereby 1 means 'very much like me' and 6 means 'not like me at all.' The determined reliability of the value types was Cronbach α= .31 -.7. Examples of items for the ten motivationally distinct types of values are:
• Power: 'It is important to him to be rich. 
Sample
From the 35,441 citizens from nine countries (the Czech Republic, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Hungary, Norway, Poland, and Sweden) that participated in the ESS fourth-(n1= 17,931) and eighth round (n2= 17,510), 26,680 respondents who answered all the questions on social solidarity and social differentiation scales were included in the analysis. They were divided into three groups: The Visegrad group (7,106 respondents), was represented by the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary (the fourth member, the Slovak Republic, was not included in the analysis because the country did not participate in the eighth round, and thus we could not examine changes between rounds). Western Europe (10,863 respondents), represented by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, and Northern Europe (8,711 respondents), represented by Finland, Norway, and Sweden. The most common type of attitude to welfare in our sample was social democratic (30.3 per cent), followed by conservative (28.2 per cent), liberal (23.7 per cent) and, last, the radical type (17.8 per cent). Looking at the differences in types of welfare attitudes among the three groups of countries, we see (in Table 1 ) how the welfare regime is reflected in welfare attitudes. The greatest proportion of people in the V4 region are liberal, Western Europe is mostly conservative, and Northern Europe is predominantly represented by the social democratic type. Nevertheless, all countries include a certain number of people from each category. First, we were interested in possible changes in the level of social solidarity and social differentiation in the three groups of countries over time, or more precisely, between rounds. According to the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test of normality, the assumption of normal distribution failed. In such a robust sample, tests of normality are overly conservative and the assumption of normality can be rejected too easily. Nevertheless, plotting the histograms and normal Q-Q plots of variables indicated that our data is approximately normally distributed without skewness and kurtosis. With group size approximately equal (largest/smallest≤1.5) (Stevens, 1996: 249) , it is possible to use parametric statistics, even if a Levene test rejects the hypothesis of equal variances. Two-way between-groups analysis of variance was conducted to explore the impact of rounds four and eight on the levels of social solidarity in the different countries. Participants were categorized into three groups of countries: the V4 region, Western-, and Northern European countries. The interaction effect between groups of countries and rounds (F (2) = 35.28, p <.001), the main effect on groups of countries (F (2) = 1082.75, p <.001) and of rounds (F (1) = 38.09, p <.001) were statistically significant.
Follow-up tests were conducted to explore this relationship further. We looked at the results for each of the subgroups separately. First, we split up the file by round, and repeated the analysis separately for the fourth and eighth round. Statistically significant differences were present among all three groups but the effect sizes suggest that it is not valid to speak about such differences. Second, we split up the file by country group and repeated the analysis separately for the V4, Western-, and Northern European countries. A statistically significant difference in level of social solidarity between the fourth and eighth round was shown only in the V4 region (F (1) = 63.951, p<.001) with a small effect size. In the graph below ( Figure 2 ) the level of social solidarity for three groups of countries in both rounds can be seen. On a fivepoint scale, where 5 represents the highest level of solidarity and 1 stands for the lowest level of solidarity, all groups of countries scored in the top half of the scale. Differences between groups of countries and rounds are quite small, as the lowest measured value 3.04 is for V4 in the fourth round and the highest measured value of 3.61 is for Northern Europe in the eighth round. Figure 2 . Level of social solidarity for three groups of countries in the fourth and eighth round of the ESS The same analysis was carried out for the second variable, social differentiation. The results of ANOVA showed a statistically significant main effect for groups of countries (F (2) = 1127.85, p<.001); round (F (1) =83.469, p<.001), and also for the interaction of groups of countries and round (F (2) = 10.05, p<.001).
To examine potential differences, we split up the file by round. Analysis of the fourth round (F (1) =726.22, p<.001), and eighth round (F (1) =435.58, p<.001) suggests that V4 and Western European countries differ from Northern Europe in their level of differentiation but the effect sizes are quite small. Next, we split up the file by country group. Differences in level of social differentiation between the fourth and eighth round showed up in the V4 region (F (1) =30.17, p<.001); Western European countries (F (1) = 73.242, p<.001), and Northern European countries (F (1) = 4.184, p=.041) with small effect sizes. In other words, differences are too small to speak about any practical significance. The graph below (Figure 3 ) depicts the level of social differentiation for the V4, Northern-, and Western European countries in the fourth and eighth round. On a five-point scale, where 5 means the highest level of differentiation and 1 is the lowest level, all groups of countries scored in upper half of the scale. Differences among countries are quite low, as the lowest measured value (of 3) is for Northern Europe in the eighth round and the highest measured value 3.47 is for V4 in the fourth round. The first part of the analysis revealed no great differences in the preferred level of social solidarity and social differentiation across Europe, and over time. The average score on both scales and small effect sizes of differences between groups and rounds suggest that European countries have similar welfare attitudes when analysed according to regime type. These results actually lead us to the second part of the analysis; as we can identify four distinct types of attitudes to welfare in every country, we hypothesize that there should be some differences between them. We already know that the former differ in terms of levels of social solidarity and social differentiation. As social and institutional trust is often linked to welfare attitudes, and individual attitudes are formed in consensus with values, we decided to analyse those two variables to identify potential differences.
Differences in interpersonal and institutional trust among types of attitude to welfare
As welfare benefits and services are provided by the welfare state to citizens, we assume that the four types of welfare attitude would differ in relation to trust in people and institutions. First, we checked the assumptions using ANOVA. Due to the fact that the homogeneity of variances between groups is violated, we used non-parametric statistical tests. A Kruskal-Wallis test revealed statistically significant differences in interpersonal trust (χ2 (3, n= 26 555) = 1610.09, p < .001) and institutional trust (χ2 (3, n= 24557) = 2059.67, p < .001) among the four types of attitudes to welfare.
To explore possible differences, we conducted a Mann-Whitney U test. The test revealed significant differences in interpersonal and institutional trust among all groups. To find out the effect sizes of differences, we calculated an approximate value of r = z / square root of N, where N = total number of cases. According to Cohen's criterion, differences appeared to range from small to almost medium size in significance. Moreover, the biggest difference was measured between the social democratic and the liberal type (0.3 and 0.4) and the social democratic and conservative type (0.2) for both types of trust.
To sum up, the results of the analysis are quite similar for interpersonal and institutional trust. There are statistically significant differences in both types of trust among four attitudinal types with small-to medium effect sizes. The level of both types of trust for groups of attitude to welfare are depicted in Figure 4 . As can be seen, the social democratic type has the highest level of trust, while the liberal type is the least trusting of both people and institutions. It seems reasonable to expect that people with different welfare attitudes will also differ in terms of value preferences. In Figure 5 , the mean values of four groups are presented. Here, it would probably be useful to mention again that lower values in Schwartz's Portrait Values Questionnaire express the higher personal importance of the former values. Because the PVQ data we obtained did not fit the requirements of normal distribution, for the purposes of statistical analysis the nonparametric Jonckheere-Terpstra test was used. For four of the ten values in Schwartz's circular model, statistically significant differences were not confirmed; namely Power, Achievement, Stimulation, and Benevolence. For the other six values the results of statistical tests confirmed the presence of differences at less than the conventional level of probability (p<0.010). Hedonism (which in Schwartz's [2012] theory of basic values is expressed by striving for pleasure and/or sensuous personal gratification), Selfdirection (characterized by independent thought and action), Tradition (described by respect and commitment), Conformity (expressed by self-restraint and obedience), and Security (connected with a desire for stability, harmony, and safety) unite two groups with a stress on social differentiation (Liberal and Conservative) whose preferences for these values are higher than in the groups Social democratic or Radical. Only in the case of Universalism (expressed by understanding, tolerance, and a desire for the protection of welfare of nature and people) is the social solidarity parameter of welfare attitudes shared by the Conservative and Social democratic groups, whose preference for these values was higher than in the other two groups. The main aim of this article was to examine the actual state and potential changes in the welfare attitudes of nine countries that participated in the fourth (2008) and eighth (2016) round of the European Social Survey. We were interested in two aspects of welfare attitudes: First, social solidarity that was operationalized as support for providing benefits and services to people who are in need of the welfare state. This is understood as indirect solidarity at a national level. Despite the fact that people contribute to welfare systems by paying taxes, the former kind of support requires a different level of commitment compared to the support offered by charities or other direct help. Second, when it comes to the limits of solidarity, we can talk about a second aspect of welfare attitudes; namely, social differentiation. This concept was operationalized as a belief in the negative consequences of providing benefits and services, thus agreement with the former opinion represents a demand for greater differentiation in society.
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Three groups of countries as representatives of different welfare regimes were compared: The V4 region (as liberal), Western European countries (as conservative), and Northern European countries (as social democratic). The selection of three countries per group (instead of comparing all countries) was used as the method for presenting the stability and similarity of welfare attitudes in Europe. Moreover, the influence of the welfare regime on distribution of types of attitude to welfare was shown. Although the selected countries did not represent ideal-type welfare regimes, we may talk about them as about three different geographical regions of Europe which are historically and culturally close, with similar value orientations.
The usual perspective in the attitude-value relations literature involves expectations of strong mutual ties, with a possible impact of situational factors (Maio and Olson, 1995) . This is the case in the relationship between social values and welfare attitudes. Pearce and Taylor (2013), after analyzing British Social Attitude survey data related to three decades of development of welfare attitudes, concluded that while attitudes to income inequality and redistribution remained relatively stable, attitudes towards welfare provision for the unemployed behaved in a cyclical way independent of the actual economic situation. Despite this, empirical evidence (Arikan and Ben-Nun Bloom, 2013) of strong mutual ties has been derived not only from the ESS (comprising a large pool of European nations), but also from ISSP data (comprising a more diverse pool of industrialized and developing countries). Our analysis also supports the assumption that people with different welfare attitudes have specific value preferences. This result should not be seen as surprising -the assumption that welfare attitudes depend on welfare regimes such as those defined by Esping-Andersen is supported by an analysis of ISSP data (Jaeger, 2009 ). Kulin and Svalffors (2013: 155) , in an article based on ESS data, confirmed the close link between values and attitudes towards redistribution, which is 'generally stronger in more materially secure classes.' Our finding is that the social differentiation dimension of welfare attitudes had more impact on the value-attitude link than the social solidarity dimension.
In the literature (Rothstein et al., 2010; Daniele and Geys, 2015) there are assumptions that universal welfare states generate trustworthiness in their citizens, but also some speculation about the opposite direction of causality; i.e., that societies with a higher level of trust are more disposed to the successful creation of a universal welfare state with high taxation and high social benefits (Bergh and Bjørnskov, 2011; Bjørnskov and Svendsen, 2013) . A causal relationship between trust and welfare support was confirmed by Daniele and Geys (2015) as well. Moreover, a stronger effect was found to be present in countries where institutions are perceived as fair. The results of our analysis support this claim about differences in welfare attitudes according to level of trust. When people believe that those who receive money actually need it, their social trust is stronger. In our sample of four types of attitude to welfare, the situation was the same for those social democrats who live in Northern-as well as Western Europe and V4 countries. However, individuals who distrust people are liable to feel that others are receiving money they are not entitled to, and this belief is more typical of people with liberal and conservative welfare attitudes.
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Conclusion
The above analysis has shown that the three groups of countries differ in terms of welfare attitudes (more specifically, as regards the level of social solidarity and social differentiation) to a minimal extent. In reference to social solidarity, only the average score of Northern Europeans is positive, while individuals from Western European countries and the V4 region on average scored negatively. Despite the fact that the level of social solidarity has slightly increased in the V4 region in the period 2008-2016, this group of countries still shows the least solidarity. Regarding social differentiation, all three groups of countries scored in the upper part of the scale; in other words, they demonstrated a preference for a stratified society.
The minimal changes that occurred between 2008 and 2016 can possibly be explained by the re-emergence of the financial crisis which increased uncertainty and concern about daily life. Data collection from the fourth round (2008) of ESS was conducted during the economic and financial crisis in Europe but started at different times in participating countries. While the financial crisis had ended, and the level of unemployment had returned to pre-crisis levels by 2016 when the eighth round was conducted, people could have been influenced by the migrant crisis. We can assume that because social benefits and services are allocated to people regardless of nationality, in the case of asylum-seekers people could be concerned about the perceived misuse of money. Furthermore, as the level of trust in people and institutions is mostly negatively oriented, further research about the level of perceived procedural justice is suggested. The question we are not currently able to answer is if and to what extent welfare attitudes in European countries were affected by contextual factors such as the presence of the crisis.
